Catégories : environnement montagne

Type d'article : individuel (CC by-nc-nd)

Testimony

Despite a fierce wind and a significant avalanche risk (3), a group of skiers decided to head out on a route they knew well, in order to test their abilities in a critical situation. They had underestimated the severity of the conditions they would face and found themselves in a survival scenario, before being persuaded by French mountain rescue (the PGHM) to turn back in the midst of the storm, given that the weather was expected to worsen the following day.

Detailed description

We had planned to traverse the Taillefer to reach the Plateau des Lacs and spend the night at the Cabane de la Jasse mountain hut. In terms of equipment, we had everything we needed to sleep comfortably at -5 degrees, as well as a stove and plenty of food (an important detail). We had adequately prepared for the outing and had kept a close eye on the weather throughout the preceding week. The forecast had predicted 100 km/h gusts of wind between 11am and midnight on that Saturday. We figured that we would go anyway, the idea being to deliberately get into trouble as a way of learning how to get out of it (a very bad decision), despite being aware that rescue operations wouldn’t be possible that day.

We set off from the Route du Poursollet in good spirits and at a leisurely pace, given that we had a lot of time to spare. As we reached the Crête du Brouffier ridge, we spotted the Pas de la Mine, which seemed from afar to be covered in cornices and wind slabs. We therefore decided to go via the Pas de la Vache (a good decision?), which meant descending slightly towards the Brouffier Lake. The climb went well and we were sheltered from the strong wind on the north face. We then reached the ridge, which two of us managed to climb onto on skis and the other participant on foot. The wind was not excessive and we were well protected by the cornice, although we were hit by a few gusts of around 60km-70km/h. During this 50m stretch, falling was unthinkable.

And then suddenly the conditions became hellish. We continued towards the Pas de la Vache signpost and then onto the large flat part of the Crête du Brouffier ridge. The wind was no longer blowing in gusts, but constantly at over 100km/h, which meant we could only advance very slowly. When we had almost reached the end of this flat section, the wind became even more intense. The three of us were thrown to the ground in what was a horrendous and absolutely relentless storm, with chunks of hard snow and ice thrashing against our heads (wearing our helmets for the climb had been a good decision). We somehow managed to regroup by crawling on all fours, before opting to turn around and crawl back to the Pas de la Vache sign. We spent about an hour in this atrocious storm.

We managed to find a bit of shelter from the worst of the wind and decided to dig a snow cave in which to spend the night, because going back via the exposed section seemed unthinkable. It took us a good two and a half hours to dig a shelter in which the three of us could lie down. We made a roof with our skis, poles, a survival blanket and some blocks of snow to cover them up. The fact that we kept moving meant that we stayed warm, although we did start to shiver a little and we were getting wetter by the minute. Once we had finished the roof, we decided to call mountain rescue (by this point it was 5pm) to inform them of the predicament (...) we had got ourselves into. We started heating up some water and took out our mattresses. Mountain rescue called us back at 5:30pm and strongly recommended that we leave the area and go back down the mountain via the same route. (…) 30 cm of snow was expected to fall overnight and the next day would see fog and some wind, if a little less than the previous day, but they warned us that a helicopter rescue would be totally impossible by that time. They hung up and we all looked at each other. We were extremely apprehensive and our anxiety went up a notch. We decided to leave (a good decision), which meant packing everything up, donning our crampons and digging up the roof to retrieve our skis and poles. The wind was calmer than it had been at the top, but we were still struggling to stay upright. One member of the group was becoming very anxious. Once our packs were ready, we began to descend cautiously holding an ice axe and a pole. (…) The intensity of the wind turned out to be the same as on the way up, which meant that getting through the narrow passage was achievable. At 6.30pm, mountain rescue called us back. We were out of the worst section and ready to clip in to our skis for the descent. It was getting dark (...) We arrived safe and sound at La Morte at 8.30 pm, mentally and physically exhausted and quite wet.

Route analysis

Two of the three skiers in the group had already done this route earlier in the season. We avoided the Pas de la Mine, since the south-easterly wind had created a cornice and the snow looked as though it was covered in wind slabs. It had been windy earlier on the Crête du Brouffier ridge, but not enough to make us want to turn back. We could see that the wind was strong on the Arête du Brouffier in the distance, but we were not aware of the danger ahead.

Conditions

The avalanche risk was rated 3/5 above 2,000m. Most of the route was above 2,000m, so during the ascent we took a detour around any slopes steeper than 30°. The weather forecast had remained unchanged all week, with south-easterly winds of 50km/h all day, gusting to over 90km/h, but we decided to go up anyway.

Physical preparation and technical ability

We had already tackled the Taillefer earlier on in the season. We knew the route (cognitive bias) and were familiar with the key sections where you have to go through one at a time or sometimes even turn back. Physically speaking, we were ready. We go ski touring or mountaineering almost every weekend.

Factors that aggravated the consequences of the event

Failing to give up on the plan despite the wind that had been forecast.

Factors that mitigated the consequences of the event

• Wearing a helmet during the ascent.
• Bringing crampons and an ice axe.
• Having everything we needed to survive in a snow cave, in case we were forced to sleep in the hole.
• Setting our egos aside and calling mountain rescue when our lives were not yet in danger.

Impact on future behaviours

Many lessons were learned that day. We should never have gone up on the mountain and considered such an exposed route when the wind was so strong. There were a few people on the Crête du Brouffier ridge, but not all of them went any further. Also, we should have called mountain rescue at 3pm, because once the hole had been dug, however crudely, we were sheltered from the wind.

Analysis

This analysis highlights the most significant factors, while also making reference to reports of other incidents and known decision-making biases. Our aim is not to imagine retrospectively what could have been done to prevent the incident, nor to pass judgement on a situation that any individual might one day face. Nor will we comment on the conditions on the ground that day (snow conditions, ice conditions, weather, the potential for rock or serac falls), but rather on the risk assessment conducted and the behaviours of those involved. Our objective is to highlight all the key points and, if necessary, to suggest ways in which similar situations could be better managed.

By Maud Vanpoulle high-altitude mountain guide and accidentologist
Reviewed by: Jérôme Gabos and Loïc Perrin (camptocamp) and Olivier Moret (Petzl Foundation).

Key points and food for thought

Familiarity, a reassuring factor

Familiarity with the route being taken is known to generate cognitive bias (McCammon, 2004, 2009). It can lead individuals to underestimate other hazards that are completely unrelated to the route itself. Being on familiar terrain is cited as a factor that contributes to reduced vigilance in 22% of the SERAC reports analysed up to 2021.

Overly optimistic time management

We set off from the Route du Poursollet in good spirits and at a leisurely pace, given that we had a lot of time to spare.
19% of reports in the SERAC database state that poor time management led to a critical situation occurring. When a storm with gusts of up to 100 km/h is forecast for midday, it is wise, not to say crucial, to plan to reach a safe spot by mid-morning. In this particular case, it clearly would have been preferable to cancel the outing the previous day when it was being planned, or in the early hours of the morning.

The danger signs were clearly identified (winds of 100km/h were forecast and the avalanche risk was rated 3/5 above 2,000m), but were downplayed

A discrepancy between the conditions anticipated during the planning phase and the reality encountered on the ground is reported in 18% of the accounts analysed in SERAC. This discrepancy is often due to participants underestimating the level of difficulty of a route or, on this particular day, the harshness of the weather conditions.
In the case in question, the 100km/h gusts of wind forecast and the avalanche risk of 3 above 2,000m were clear indicators of the horrific conditions that would be encountered and should in themselves have been reason enough to cancel the outing. The participants appeared to be aware of what awaited them, but downplayed the information. This suggests a powerful desire on their part to go up into the mountains that day, together with a tinge of optimism derived from the equipment they had packed, which led the group to focus more on the factors that supported the viability of the tour.
In terms of equipment, we had everything we needed to sleep comfortably at -5 degrees, as well as a stove and plenty of food. We had adequately prepared for the outing and had kept a close eye on the weather throughout the preceding week…
The determination to stick to a plan at all costs can lead the organisers of a tour to place too much emphasis on “positive” signals and to underestimate any “negative” factors, resulting in the latter being relegated to the background.

The event in question displays parallels with two other serious accidents that occurred when a storm had been forecast:
- The 2018 accident that claimed the lives of 7 ski tourers on a section of the Chamonix-Zermatt Haute Route, near the Vignettes mountain hut.
Read the article on the Outside website
Watch the documentary (available until 10 June 2024)
- The accident of 9 March 2024 (5 fatalities) near the Tête Blanche (Valais) Article on the Outside website

The intention to “deliberately get into trouble as a way of learning how to get out of it” is understandable, but questionable.

Taking risks and dealing with critical situations is an essential part of the learning process for mountaineers. However, the need to practice survival and rescue techniques in real-life situations is debatable. Taking refuge in a hole dug in the snow allows a person to survive at temperatures of around 0°, sheltered from the elements. Many mountaineers owe their lives to these makeshift shelters, while others have died because they did not think to dig one in time. Nevertheless, this option should only be considered as a last resort in critical situations where turning back is no longer feasible (night falling, a storm, a companion who is injured or exhausted, etc.). This is a skill that requires practice, because it isn’t easy to build a makeshift shelter in a storm when the snow has been partially blown away by the wind.
Ideally, you should build your first shelters near a mountain hut or another backup option.
_“Having everything we needed to survive in a snow cave, in case we were forced to sleep in the hole” _was obviously a positive safety factor for the group, but one could also say that it encouraged them to go ahead with the plan when abandoning it at an earlier stage would have been more sensible.

Turning back at the right time

Like most of the adventures we experience in the mountains, this story raises the question of when to turn back. For this to be an option, it is important to retain some room for manoeuvre or the capacity to adapt to a situation, and to do so for as long as possible. By persevering for too long, you run the risk of eliminating alternative options or becoming trapped, making turning back difficult, if not impossible. At this point, the only option is to take shelter (igloo, snow hole, etc.) and wait for a lull in the weather or until a rescue operation can be carried out.
In this account, we can identify several points at which the participants could have decided to turn back, before getting caught up in a survival situation:
- During the planning phase, when examining the weather forecast: 100 km/h gusts of wind and an avalanche risk of 3.
- When they arrived at the Crête du Brouffier ridge and observed that “The Pas de la Mine seemed from afar to be covered in cornices and wind slabs”.
- Under the Pas de la Vache, when the situation became quite critical: the wind was blowing at 60-70 km/h and falling was unthinkable.

Giving up is never synonymous with failure, but rather with adaptability and situational intelligence, which the group displayed by seeking the advice of the emergency services and then undertaking a cautious descent with the appropriate equipment.

Other plus points not mentioned by the report’s author were good group management during the event and the way the participants communicated in order to navigate this near-miss as best as possible.