Catégories : environnement montagne

Type d'article : individuel (CC by-nc-nd)

Testimony

15 years after completing the Olan crossing without a hitch, a group of amateurs decide to return to the area with two extra friends. Their distant recollections lead them to underestimate the scale of the climb and the time it will take to complete it with two rope teams. The resulting delay, coupled with the fact that they can’t find a particular rappel anchor on the way down, forces them to set up a makeshift bivouac to avoid any further mishaps. The next morning, a member of the group comes close to falling on the glacier, but just manages to catch himself.

Description

The plan was to repeat the crossing of the Olan, which Stéphane and I had done 15 years previously, but this time with two extra friends, Thierry and Christian, both mountaineers who don’t climb quite as often as they used to. We had decided to form two two-man rope teams.
We agreed to get up at 3.30am (on the previous occasion, we were up at 2am and reached the summit at 10.30am...), thinking it would be perfect!

At the “square window”, I made a mistake: I was too sure of myself (I hadn’t read the route guides carefully enough this time). I traversed too low and had to climb up the chimney beneath the gap... It felt much harder than I’d remembered... 
We reached the summit at 3.30pm, which was late... Much later than 15 years ago (when we had arrived at 10:30am). But it’s harder to make quick progress with two mismatched rope teams. At the antecima we had to rappel down and obviously we lost more time because there were four of us...

We put the ropes away so that we could each continue independently and without being hindered in the couloir and on the ledge: this is fine as long as you can find a good route. I remembered it being easier, but in fact it was a proper Alpine section with constant exposure.
We reached the point above the glacier just before 8.00pm, so we were way behind schedule... We had already warned the warden of the Olan refuge that we would be late, but we were getting closer to our goal! Or so we thought... All we had to do now was find the rappel route, which had recently been redone (three to five 25m rappels, depending on the source). I quickly descended around fifteen metres and started to look for the next anchor point. After 25m there was nothing, so I swung right and then left, looking around as far as I could on each side, but still nothing! I tied a knot at the end of the rope and continued down to the 30-metre mark. I looked everywhere, but still no anchor! We just couldn’t understand.
However, I did find a spike of rock. So everyone rappelled down and I thought we would be able to keep going using this spike. But I was soon put off the idea: in reality, the spike was not going to work: it did not protrude sufficiently, having been worn away by the old glacier, and the rope was rolling around on it quite hazardously... Time passed and night fell. What were we to do?
{ What followed was a downclimb and some buddy rappels using the cams we had brought with us, until eventually we found a rappel chain 45m down, which took some time }. I then joined up with the rest of the group. It was 11pm and we had found a rappel chain and a small ledge at the foot of it. We wondered what we should do. The glacier was within our reach now, just two or three rappels away, but it was already very late and some of the members of the group were exhausted. We took the (sensible) decision to stop at this point after what had been a very long day, which meant setting up a bivouac in this ledge. Luckily, we each had a survival blanket, but it was a tough night for all of us on this tiny ledge. We had to try and sleep curled up in a variety of positions... I spent the last three hours of the night shivering and chattering my teeth almost continuously, like I had never done before...
The next morning, everyone managed to get onto the glacier, put on their crampons and form two rope teams once again. But just as he was rounding a crevasse and walking across an area of old, hard ice, Thierry fell and slipped. I immediately jumped into the small blocked up crevasse we were skirting, in an attempt to arrest his fall (especially as we were on a traverse!). Fortunately, he quickly managed to stop sliding by himself. We continued onwards with a great deal of trepidation.
On some awkward sections in very hard old snow, I decided to belay him using my ice axe with the blade plunged as deep as possible into the snow. It was going to take some time, but it wouldn’t make much difference now !

Route analysis

A route that was familiar and had been completed previously.

Physical preparation and technical ability / Safety measures and techniques implemented

Three members of the group had a good level of ability, but the 4th was both slower and less sure footed in the trickier sections, whether it be on rock or on the glacier.
Given the difficulties involved in climbing down the ridge, we preferred to use a buddy rappel down the steepest and most exposed sections to maximise safety, even though this meant we lost a lot of time.
During our descent of the glacier, given the combination of difficulties we faced, including the presence of numerous crevasses + old, very hard ice + the fact that my second was struggling (he also fell there), I decided that we should make a multi-pitch descent using an ice axe belay in the trickiest sections, which again took a lot of time, but this was no longer the main issue. I had a fright during this descent, when my second fell the first time, because it was on a traverse and it was difficult for me to arrest his fall given the configuration of the slope. That’s when I realised that we were going to have to do things differently, because there was too high a risk that another fall would happen and that it would be hard to arrest.

Level of awareness and assessment of the risks

We had overestimated the ability of one (or two) members of the group to cope with the technical difficulties and level of commitment involved in descending the upper part of the Escarra route.
In our 15-year-old recollections, going down the glacier had been a simple formality, because we were able to scramble down the soft snow that covered it with ease. It wasn’t like that in early August 2022.

Time management

We had a frame of reference because Stéphane and I had taken this route 15 years earlier. But things didn’t work out quite the same this time. The sluggish pace of my second in the first rope team, which I was leading, slowed everyone down from the moment we entered the Alpine section of the route (which was a long section anyway). The technical difficulties and level of commitment involved + the degree of independence required on the upper part of the Escarra route made things even worse. As a result, descending the Escarra ridge took way too long, but this could not be avoided if we were to ensure the safety of the entire group, so it was a conscious choice.
However, from the Escarra gap onwards, we managed to advance unroped until we reached the rappels.

Factors that mitigated the consequences of the event

Everyone had a survival blanket for the impromptu bivouac.
The group’s cohesion (because the four of us were old friends who knew each other well) meant that we were able to make the right decisions for the group and its safety, taking into account everyone’s levels of ability and fitness.

Analysis

This analysis highlights the most significant factors, while also making reference to reports of other incidents and known decision-making biases. Our aim is not to imagine retrospectively what could have been done to prevent the incident, nor to pass judgement on a situation that any individual might one day face. Nor will we comment on the conditions on the ground that day (snow conditions, ice conditions, weather, the potential for rock or serac falls), but rather on the risk assessment conducted and the behaviours of those involved. Our objective is to highlight all the key points and, if necessary, to suggest ways in which similar situations could be better managed.

By Maud Vanpoulle high-altitude mountain guide and accidentologist
Reviewed by: Jérôme Gabos and Loïc Perrin (camptocamp) and Olivier Moret (Petzl Foundation).

Key points and food for thought

Familiarity, a reassuring factor from the outset

Familiarity with the route being taken is known to generate cognitive bias. It can lead individuals to underestimate other hazards. Being on familiar terrain is cited as a factor that contributes to reduced vigilance in 22% of the 149 SERAC reports analysed up to 2021.
In this report, a “sense of familiarity” is at play, since two of the participants had taken this route 15 years previously. Given that the two leaders had completed it without any issues and almost “with ease” the previous time, there was a general feeling of confidence that seemed to lay the ground for all the other “deviations” and misjudgements that occurred. They failed to update their analysis based on the group’s true capabilities (they were older now and the new team members climbed less frequently) and the conditions up on the mountain (changing conditions linked partly to climate change and glacial retreat).

Overconfidence ahead of the outing

_"At the square breach, I made a mistake : I was too sure of myself (I hadn’t read the route guides carefully enough this time)” _
11% of SÉRAC accounts report a degree of overconfidence: the protagonists feel fit, are coming off a series of outings where everything has gone well, or off a very good day, and this can lead to excessive confidence in their abilities or in “their luck”. This overconfidence reduces doubt and therefore distorts the assessment of risk.

Like in 12% of the SÉRAC stories analysed previously, it is evident that the efforts made to plan the route and analyse the conditions were insufficient, which is a logical result of overconfidence and familiarity.

Poor time management

19% of the stories analysed point towards poor time management, which results either from an assessment of the difficulties ahead that is too approximative and which fails to take full account of the participants’ levels of ability, or from there having been little or no advance schedule planning. In this report, poor time management combined with a sense of familiarity with the route (familiarity bias) were the key factors that led to the critical situation.

Feedback from the experience

The right balance between speed, efficiency and safety

The authors acknowledge that they “took way too long (…) to ensure the safety of the entire group”.

Speed, often a guarantee of safety in the mountains, must not be counterproductive and confused with haste.
In this particular case, the two rope teams were still able to take certain precautions despite the delay: safely making a belayed descent of the Escarra ridge, buddy rappels and downclimbing using cams, deciding to set up a bivouac, ice axe belaying on the glacier, etc. Advancing efficiency and quickly is usually recommended, as long as the situation is “normal” or under control. When setbacks or scares build up, it is wise to slow down to maintain a degree of safety that is compatible with the group’s level of technical ability and fatigue.

The excessive haste our previous analyses have highlighted in 13% of SÉRAC reports can result in critical situations or even accidents. Most commonly, it leads to a drop in vigilance or belaying with undue care which, when combined with fatigue, can have dramatic consequences.

Staying roped up even in (apparently) easy sections

Despite the prioritisation of safety over speed, the report mentions the decision to “advance independently” along a particular stretch, i.e., unroped between the summit and the rappels. Advancing independently without a rope and/or without using anchor points is still sometimes considered more efficient. However, falls remain the main cause of accidents in summer mountaineering, be they minor or fatal1.
Being roped up, keeping moving and setting up protection equipment (spikes, slings, possibly a camming device, or a short rope belay if participants are skilled in the technique) are still the safest ways of minimising the consequences of a fall. This requires experience and unwavering concentration. However, if done properly, this is almost as fast and much safer than climbing without belaying. Staking your safety on your own level of technical ability or that of your companions is always a gamble.

The (right) decision to set up a bivouac to prevent a potential accident

The decision to stop, despite the temptation to try and reach the hut that evening, undoubtedly prevented the situation from deteriorating, not least as a result of exhaustion and the advancing hour. The consequences of the fall that occurred on the glacier the following day could have been much harder to deal with had it happened in the middle of the night, after 20 hours of exertion.

We would like to thank the authors of this report for sharing their experience and for their willingness to engage in this critical analysis so as to help build collective expertise.