Catégories : environnement montagne

Type d'article : individuel (CC by-nc-nd)

Accounts of the incidents

We chose and analysed two accounts of falls caused by lost handholds, one involving an unroped climber and the other involving a roped climber with little protection in place. In both cases, the terrain was relatively easy and there was a degree of overconfidence on the part of the protagonists, as well as a desire to progress swiftly and somewhat inadequate communication between the members of the rope teams.

Account 1 - Unroped fall on the Toit Pyramide ridge (Belledonne) : detailed description

We approached via Lac de l’Âne after camping at Rieu-Claret, having set off before dawn (5:40 am). We donned our harnesses and helmets at the intersection of the three ridges. We set off having tacitly agreed not to rope up, without mentioning it explicitly. We left our cams in my bag, and the rope remained in a butterfly coil around Quentin’s neck. I went ahead on the first section of the ridge, which is horizontal. Quentin followed, but a gap formed between us when Quentin put his bag down to fix the rope above him, because we did actually need to use our hands. I reached a small breach that would require me to climb down 2-3 metres. Quentin must have been 20-30 metres behind me. The downclimb didn’t look too bad (difficulty III) so I decided to go for it. My carefree mood ended abruptly when I set off using an untested handhold. I fell down the Rieu-Claret side, bouncing several times off a slab that was inclined at around 45 degrees. I probably fell around 20 metres. I turned around and saw that one more bounce, just one, would have been my final leap... I couldn’t believe I was alive, my mind was all over the place...

Quentin didn’t see me fall or land. He just heard an « Oh shit! », then small rocks falling, my body bouncing, a few more rocks, and then nothing. He called out to me. I eventually answered and he found me. (…) To avoid sending any more rocks my way, Quentin decided to come down to me using a route that wasn’t directly above me, but the terrain was very steep, very earthy and covered in nasty, loose rocks. So he descended solo, after which he set up a belay on a ledge a couple of metres away from me and threw me a length of rope. We had to climb back up onto the ridge, using a cam as a belay point. Quentin climbed up the crack running along the slab, securing himself along the way. He set up a belay on the ridge and I joined him. (...) I continued back down the ridge, which was now widening, and we returned to the original intersection, the start point of the route. What followed was relief and much-needed rest.

Motivating factors

I had been dreaming about doing this for a while and I felt like going back to the area. With two weeks to go before the climb, I still hadn’t found anyone to go with me. I also wanted to complete a route cleanly and according to schedule – I have a long list of excursions where I failed to do so.

Factors that contributed to the accident

• It was our first outing together and we didn’t talk enough about safety.
• We wanted to be quick.
• A lack of communication around safety.
• Not being roped up: if we had been roped together 10 metres apart on this horizontal ridge and advanced with a taut rope, I am convinced that a fall would easily have been arrested.
• Not checking holds.

Accident prevention advice and messages to peers

Best practice would be (and I hope will be) to always explicitly raise the issue of roping up when you’re getting kitted out. The decision must be a joint one and easily reversible. The reported condition of the rock along the route being tackled must be a key decision-making factor. And you have to remind each other to test all holds. Even if you don’t rope up, tuck a rope in your bag and clip one end to a shoulder strap: you need to be able to change your mind at any time without having to put your bag down, which also makes it easier to stay close together. My companion’s impromptu turn as a rescue worker was almost too enthusiastic and could actually have led to another accident (he wasn’t roped up either). It’s important to consider the possibility of these types of situation – which are by definition unforeseen – by thinking about all the different eventualities: if this happens to me, will I call mountain rescue, will I be able to control my stress levels, can I stay safe while providing help, etc.? You always have to take a moment to assess the situation carefully before acting.

Account 2 - Fall on the SW ridge of Les Rouies (Ecrins) : detailed description

We left the Chalance refuge at around 5am. The day before, we had carefully mapped out the approach to the Col de la Muande. We roped up and reached the start of the ridge with ease. (...) We kept a distance of 15 to 20 metres between us. The accident happened just as Adrienne set off in the lead. Adrienne left the anchor and Aline belayed using an Italian hitch on a sling placed on a natural belay. Adrienne set up the first anchor (red cam in a crack on a ledge). She was hesitating over which route to take: straight ahead was steep and the rock was not good. She decided to follow a ledge that climbed slowly leftwards, veering away from the ridge line. At the start of the ledge, she saw a natural anchor point above her to which she could attach a sling, but it was too high to do so without climbing. So she kept going. Except that further on, it was impossible to set up any belays. She turned around and walked back 5 metres to set up the natural belay she had originally spotted. She took the sling in her right hand, found a hold for her left hand that seemed solid, and began to climb. Suddenly, the hold broke and she started to fall. It was steep terrain, but not vertical, with lots of rocks and clumps of earth. Just as Adrienne turned around, Aline, who was belaying with an Italian hitch and a sling, had just untied the knot because she had reached the end of the rope. By retracing her steps, Adrienne had caused the rope to slacken. When Aline pulled the rope in she was just feeding it through the carabiner. When Adrienne fell, Aline only saw the first impact from the belay station. Suddenly, Aline was thrown backwards and she caught herself by grabbing hold of the rope. The cam was ripped out by the fall, which also yanked out the belay sling. Aline fell 4-5 m down the other side of the ridge. It was steep, so she wasn’t hurt in the fall. Adrienne fell 15 metres and was subsequently unconscious for 10-15 minutes. When she came to, she could only respond to Aline once and weakly. Meanwhile, Aline had been trying to call 112, but to no avail due to a lack of network coverage. (…) Once she was back on the ridge, Aline pulled Adrienne up, secured her (with a rope around a large rock) and wrapped her up in a survival blanket and her down jacket. Adrienne was struggling to move and in shock. Aline took Adrienne’s phone and walked along the ridge with both of their phones to try calling 112 again. After a number of attempts (no fewer than 12 between 10:30 and 11:20), Aline managed to get through to 112 and speak to someone at around 11 am, but she couldn’t hear what they were saying. She eventually sent a text message with their GPS coordinates to 114 (the emergency number for the hearing impaired) at 11:12. The message got through. They waited for the helicopter, which arrived at 11:45 am and took them to the hospital in Briançon.

Motivations, group and communication

• Adrienne : Aline had just arrived at the camp. It was the first opportunity I’d had to go on an alpine climb without taking a beginner with me. I really wanted to do some alpine climbing rather than multi-pitch climbing. This was one of the first times that Aline and I had been in a rope team together. I was also aware that I had less experience. I told myself that, if in doubt, I would ask her for advice.
• Aline : Personally, I was more reluctant to go on a “long” two-day mission (Chalance the first day and then this climb the next day), given that I had only just arrived at the camp and that only the two of us would be going. And there was also a risk of getting out of “sync” with other people who I would also have liked to climb with. It also doesn’t feel as safe when going in a pair. Adrienne seemed very keen for us to climb this route specifically as a pair. I felt that the things Adrienne were saying were a little inconsistent, ranging from “It’s great, you’re stronger, you’ll be able to teach me some things” to “We’re on the same level, so don’t worry, you’re not going to be dragging me along.” In any case, the aim is always to have an enjoyable climb and stay safe, but I think that degree of uncertainty made me blame myself quite a bit after the event: should I have let someone take the lead without knowing their level of ability? Maybe she was looking for advice? Should I have reminded her of a few basic guidelines before/during the climb: keep the rope taut, always have two anchors between us, test the rock, communicate, etc.? I had assumed that Adrienne was aware of these necessary precautions, since she had some experience.

Factors that contributed to the accident

(Adrienne) I had just set off in the lead, I was happy to be there, the weather was nice. I was relaxed and confident (clearly too much so). Maybe I forgot to adjust my climbing pace, to be more steady. I obviously underestimated the risk. I usually test my cams when I place them by giving them a tug. I can’t remember whether I did that or not. Before I started climbing, I saw a hold on a rock that looked solid. I didn’t test it. My second hand was busy with the sling.

Summing up :
➔ Not testing holds was the biggest mistake.
➔ Aggravating factor: having no solid anchors, the rock was bad everywhere.
➔ Additional aggravating factor: not telling Aline that I was going to climb back up, which meant that she didn’t have time to set up an Italian hitch.

Analysis

This analysis highlights the most significant factors, while also making reference to reports of other incidents and known decision-making biases. Our aim is not to imagine retrospectively what could have been done to prevent the incident, nor to pass judgement on a situation that any individual might one day face. Nor will we comment on the conditions on the ground that day (snow conditions, ice conditions, weather, the potential for rock or serac falls), but rather on the risk assessment conducted and the behaviours of those involved. Our objective is to highlight all the key points and, if necessary, to suggest ways in which similar situations could be better managed.

By Maud Vanpoulle high-altitude mountain guide and accidentologist
Reviewed by : Olivier Moret (Petzl Foundation) and Jérôme Gabos (Camptocamp)

Key points and food for thought :

Falls : the most frequent type of event leading to accidents or incidents

Whether the information comes from SÉRAC or from the reports drafted by the PGHM (France’s mountain police force) after each of the numerous rescues they carry out, falls by climbers are the most frequent type of accident to occur in the mountains, ahead of so-called “objective” risks such as rock falls, serac collapses and avalanches.
In 69% of the accounts submitted to SÉRAC relating to mountaineering incidents occurring on rock, they are the second most common reason for the rescue services to be called in a mountaineering or ski mountaineering context, behind stranding. Falls result in physical injury in 82% of cases, compared with only 24% of stranding cases. In mountaineering, according to PGHM data for 2008-2018, falls are responsible for an average of 24 deaths per year in France’s mountain ranges. They occur in all kinds of discipline and environment, including mountain skiing. However, the risks and consequences are greater in snow, ice and mixed terrain, as well as in sections that are perceived as being easy.

A common theme in both stories: a high level of motivation and room for improvement when it comes to communication within the rope teams

To be noted in both accounts :

• a high level of motivation : « It was the first opportunity I’d had to go alpine climbing without taking a beginner with me. I really wanted to do some alpine climbing rather than multi-pitch climbing » ; « I had been dreaming about doing this for a while, and I felt like going back to the area. I also wanted to complete a route cleanly and according to schedule ». This motivation, which is essential when embarking upon any kind of alpine climbing trip, fuelled the participants’ enthusiasm, but also led to a degree of overeagerness that might have diminished their vigilance.
• the members of the rope teams did not know each other well, which did not help their communication around the topic of safety. One of the protagonists mentioned “tacitly” rather than “explicitly” agreeing not to rope up and, in the other pairing, one of the climbers expressed uncertainty over which topics needed to be raised : « Should I have reminded her of a few basic guidelines before/during the climb: keep the rope taut, always have two anchors between us, test the rock, communicate, etc.? I had assumed that Adrienne was aware of these necessary precautions. ».

When a new rope team is formed, chances are that its members will not have the same level of technical ability or approach to risk management. People are often afraid of imposing their opinion or giving the impression that they want to take charge. In some cases, it is assumed that the other person is in control of the situation and that there is no need to discuss certain key issues.
Regardless of the rope team’s degree of maturity, especially if this is one of their first climbs together, it is always crucial to explain how one feels and to talk about the roping and belay methods to be used.
Inadequate communication is mentioned in 19% of SERAC reports. Speaking out about the risks and how to manage them helps to sharpen the mind, allows interpretations to be discussed, encourages dialogue and, ultimately, improves safety. In other words, “what goes without saying” is better addressed and understood when it is actually said !

The perception that a route or section is easy

This is a factor highlighted in 44% of reports in the SERAC database as contributing to a drop in vigilance, inadequate belaying methods or insufficient risk assessment. Sections that at first glance seem the easiest can be the most exposed and are sometimes located in areas where falling would have serious consequences. Talking about the consequences of a fall, and not just its likelihood, leads to the adoption of more appropriate belay methods. When groups decide not to rope up, it is important to ensure that all participants agree that they can change their minds at any time and feel confident enough to express any fears. It is essential to stay close together and to establish smooth and supportive communication within the rope team.

Roping up in the middle of an easy section may seem unnecessarily tedious when there appears to be no justification for doing so. People tend to keep pushing a little further without a rope, telling themselves « It’ll be fine », even through more technical sections. However, roping up or staying roped up on easy terrain, handling ropes efficiently and mastering short-roping keeps individuals safe when the going gets tricky. This helps avoid the common but dangerous tendency to think « I can’t be bothered », which can cause climbers to leave their rope in their bag as they approach a steep slope, or even to proceed without crampons when crossing a patch of snow that is quite (too?) hard.

The quest for speed in account no. 1 ; too much attention focused on the route and the climb in account no. 2

Speed, which is often synonymous with safety in the mountains, should not come at the expense of safe belaying. Instead, the emphasis should be on using ropes more efficiently and setting up anchors, so that doing so is not perceived as a waste of time.
19 reports in the SERAC database point towards excessive haste, leading to critical situations or accidents.

In both of these cases, risk management was treated as a secondary concern :

• Account 1 : Speed and efficiency were the main priority « I also wanted to complete a route cleanly and according to schedule. »
• Account 2 : The focus was placed on making good progress and selecting the best route, rather than on the reliability of the belay or on communication with the second climber. Ambiguity around their respective roles and responsibilities probably did not aid communication at the key moment, when it came to the issues of belaying and/or placing anchors : « Adrienne was hesitating over which route to take » ; « I felt that the things Adrienne were saying were a little inconsistent (…) I think that degree of uncertainty made me blame myself quite a bit after the event: (…) Should I have reminded her of a few basic guidelines before/during the climb? »

Improvement areas and lessons to be learned applicable to both situations

• Before setting off, always clarify the general approach you will follow during the climb and the safety precautions that will be taken, if possible at the hut or during the approach hike : roping configuration, distances, rope management, belays, communication around decisions. It’s better to communicate too much than too little, especially in rope teams that are not used to climbing together.
• In mountainous terrain, always test holds and anchors, and adjust your climbing technique. Try as best you can to have three good holds at all times when climbing (rather than two).
• Don’t be afraid of taking the time to reinforce a belay, test a hold or place a secure anchor, even if the route seems “easy”. Climbing with a taut rope is faster, but it is not always the most suitable method. Bear in mind that doing so can prevent a fatal fall, but rarely prevents injury. It should therefore be limited to situations where the risk of falling is minimal. Accepting the fact that you will “lose time” by letting out a length of rope will often prove to be your salvation.
• Choice of route : on a ridge route, it is sometimes safer to stay on the ridge where you are more likely to be climbing on solid rock, rather than attempting a tricky traverse on unstable rock, even if it seems easier.
• Think ahead about dangerous situations : What would be the consequences of a fall ? How can you protect yourself if you need to help or rescue your climbing partner ? When and how should you alert the emergency services ?
• Place more emphasis on communication : clearly express your expectations, accurately represent your level of experience, express any reservations you might have, and do not be content with “unspoken assumptions” when it comes to critical aspects such as belaying, protection, unroped climbing, or even giving up on a climb and turning back.

Huge thanks to the authors of these accounts for their testimonies and the clear-headedness with which they retrospectively analysed their misadventures.